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BIOPROSPECTING OR BIOPIRACY:
DOES THE TRIPS AGREEMENT UNDERMINE THE INTERESTS OF
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES?
Internat:ionaltrade bemr.en.my country
and the West is like an antelope and a
[!jra/ft~gjOr frxxi WJich is at the
top of a tree. Yau can make the ground
beneaththeirfeet feud but the contestwill
still not befair.
- Dr Robert Al:xJagye-Mensah of
Ghana)
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS)2 created within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WIO)
poses a contentious discord between developed and developing nations.'> The
criticism that TRIPS is nothing more than a modern vehicle of western imperialism4
• PhD Candidate, Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security, Faculty of Law,
University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia (2006 to present); LL.M., Dalhousie University (Halifax, Nova
Scotia, Canada) (2004); Diploma, Rhodes Academy of Oceans Law and Policy (Rhodes, Greece) (2003); LL.B,
University of the Philippines. (2002); BA Political Science, alm/aude, University of the Philippines (1998). This
is a revised and updated version of a paper submitted for the author's course on International Trade Law at
Dalhousie University under Professor Gilbert R. Winham in 2005.
I INTERNATIONALFAIRTRADEASSOCIATION,SPEAKINGOur FORFAIRTRADE24 (2002).
2 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intelleerual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 UNTS 299,
33 ILM 1197. (1994). The TRIPS Agreement is Annex lC of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the
World Trade Organization, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994. This agreement puts in place a
multilateral framework for addressing intellectual property issues in international commercial transactions.
[hereinafter TRIPS AGREEMENT]
1 See for example, Marci A. Hamilton, The 7RIPs Agrammt: Imfnialisti£:,O"tdaurl, and OwprouaiLe, 29
VAND.J. INT'L L. 613, 615 (1996), which denounces the TRIPs as "old-fashioned, Western-style imperialism."
In 2003, even the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) released a report on the world trading
system that was highly critical of the TRIPS Agreement, stating that the "relevance of TRIPS is highly
questionable for large parts of the developing world," urging developing countries to "begin dialogues to
replace TRIPS ... with alternative intellectual property paradigms" and to seek in the interim, "to modifIy] ...
the way the agreement is interpreted and implemented. Please see, UNDP, MAKING GLOBALTRADE WORK
FORPEOPLE 221,222 (2003).
, See Lakshmi Sarma, Biopiracy:T'lW7tiffh On/my 1mperial.i!mtn the Fonn ifIntematicnal Agmmmts, 13 TEMP.
INT'L & CoMP. L. J. 107 125 (1999) (dismissing the GATI!IRlPs Agreement as simply a form of modern-
encapsulates the perception that the TRIPS is inimical to the interests of developing
countries.s
The ostensible failure of the wro regime to raise the living standards of
developing countries,6 a centerpiece putative effect of economic liberalization
heralded in the Uruguay Round,? miserably highlighted the fundamental social,
cultural and widening economic differences between the two bipolarized camps.8
Even from its inception, the apparent asymmetry in intellectual property
protection within the TRIPS regime was met by vigorous resistance by developing
day colonialism disregarding the differing needs of the lesser developed nations); Michael W. Smith, Brintjng
Deuioping Cowztries' Intell«:tllal Profx!rty L<OM to TRIPs Standards: Hurrl1es and Pitfalls Facing Vu1nam s EfjOrts to
Normalize an Intelkr:tual Profx!rtyRegime, 31 CASEW. REs. J. INT'L L. 211, 227 (1999) (noting that there are many
who view the 1RlPs as a vehicle of Western imperialism).
, Please see, Peter M. Gerhart, Ref/«tions: Bey:nd 0rnpliancE 7heary-.TRIPS as a SlIbmmtiU! Issue, 32 CASE
W. REs. J. INT'L L. 357, 361 - 362 (2000). He argues that the issue of enforcement of 1RlPS brings to fore the
basic issue of its intrinsic validity. An international instrument which is perceived as unjust will face legitimacy
problems which will render it hard for states to follow. See also, DAYA SHANKER, FAULT LINES IN mE
WORLD TRADEORGANIZATION:AN ANALYSISOF 1HE 1RlPS AGREEMENTAND DEVELOPINGCDUNTRIES,
PhD Thesis, University of Wollongong, 2005. For academic literature that discuss the wro and developing
countries, please see: ANwARULHoDA ANDASHOK GULATI,wro NEGOTIATIONS ON AGRIQJLTIJRE AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2007); GEORGE A. BERMANNAND PETROS C. MAVROIDIS(EDS), wro LAW
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2007); LARRYCRUMPAND SYED JAVED MASWOOD (EDS), DEVELOPING
COUNTRIESAND GLOBALTRADE NEGOTIATIONS (2007); BIBEK DEBROY AND DEBASHISCHAKRAIJORTY
(EDS), THE TRADE GAME:NEGOTIATION TRENDs AT wro AND CCNCERNSOF DEVELOPING COlNIlUES
(2006); BERNARD M. HOEKMAN AND PETER HOlMES, TRADE PREFERENCES AND DIFFERENTIAL
TREA1MENTOF DEVELOPINGCOUNTRIES(2006); BHAGIRAm LALDAS, THE CURRENTNEGOTIATIONS IN
mE wro: OPTIONS, OPPOR11JNITIES,AND RISKSFOR DEVELOPING CaJNTRIES (2005); SANJAYKUMAR
AND NUPUR CHOWDHURY, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT IN 1HE wrO: NEGOTIATING OPTIONS FOR
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES(2005); BASUDEBGUHA-KHAsNoBiS (ED), THE WID, DEVELOPING COlNTIUES
AND mE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: PROSPECTSAND CHALLENGES FOR TRADE·LED GROwrn
(2004); HOMI KATRAK AND ROGER STRANGE (EDS), THE wro AND DEVELOPING COlNTRIES (2004);
IVAN M. ROBERTS,FRANKJOTZO AND BENJAMINBUETRE,AGRIQJLTURALTRADE REFORM IN mE WID:
SPECIAL TREA1MENT FOR DEVELOPING CaJNTRIES (2002); CONSTANTINE MICHALOPOULOS,
DEVELOPING COUNTRIESIN mE wro (2001); BERNARDM. HOEKMANAND WILL MARTIN, DEVELOPING
COUNTRIESAND mE wro: A PRO-ACTIVEAGENDA (2001); PETER GALLAGHER, GUIDE TO mE WID
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2000); BERNARD M. HOEKMAN AND PETER HolMES, COMPETITION
POLICY,DEVELOPING COUNTRIESANDmE wro (1999).
6 Please see, Barry Coates, A DwJor;mmt A~ WztlXJutDwJor;mmt, 24/25 SOU1HERN BULLETIN, 2001,
at 10. Online at: South Centre <http://www.southcentre.org/info/southbulletin/bulletin24.25/bulletin24·
25.pdf>. See also, Asoke Mukerji, frW.cping Countries and the \.VJt): IsslIesof Implrrrmttlt.icn, 34 J. WORLD TRADE
(2000) 33 at 70. See also, FrankJ. Garcia, Tradeandln«Jllality: Ecorz011icJlIStia:andtheDer-elcping World, 21 MIGI.
J. INT'L L. 975 (2000). See also discussion in Beverly M. Carl, Cllnmt Trade Probltms of the Deuioping Nations in
PETAR SARCEVICANDHANs VANHOlmE (EDS.), LEGALISSUESIN INTERNATIONALTRADE (1990) at 100-
127.
7 It was during.the Doha Round of Negotiations (Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar which
started on November 14, 2001) that the many concerns of the developing countries were heard. Please see,
Inaamul Haque, Doha DwJor;mmt Ag.nda: R«:apturing the ManentJlm of Multilaterali..m and Deuioping Cotmtries, 17
AM. U. Ir-.rr'LL. REV. 1097 (2002). See also, Peter M. Gerhart, Slow TransjiJrmati01S:TIx \.VJt) as a Distrihlltiu!
C>rg:mizatiG'l, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1045 (2002). He argues that the Doha Round may mark the wro's
transformation from an organization concerned about the creation of wealth to an organization concerned
also about the fair distribution of wealth.
R Michael W. Smith, Bringing Deuioping Omtries' Intells:tual Profx!rty Laws to TRIPs Standards: Hurdles and
Pitfalls Facing Vzetnams EfjOrts to Normalizean Intel!eaJialProfx!rtyRegime, 31 CASEW.REs. J. INT'L L 111 (1999).
countries.9 However, the concept of the Uruguay Round of negotlatlons as
constituting a "single package" undermined the resistance of developing countries
not to accede to the instrurnent.lO It was a hard bargain. The developing countries
felt that they left the negotiating table with very little, if any, benefit. I I
This constitutes the general backdrop that situates the current debate over
the issue of misappropriation and exercise of proprietary rights by the developed
nations over the biological material of the developing nations, within the framework
of TRIPS,12 This is what has been labeled as "biopiracy," a term that describes the
means by which corporations from the industrialized nations claim ownership of,
free ride on, or otherwise take unfair advantage of, the genetic resources and
traditional knowledge and technologies of developing countries. 13
In the interest of fairness, it must be underscored at the outset that the
skepticism and mistrust cut both ways.14 The developing nations are apprehensive
that the TRIPS is merely an exploitative mechanism employed to patent indigenous
biological material.ls The developed nations, for their part, are likewise concerned
that sans the incentive of intellectual property protection, the motivation to create,
invest and invent will be lost.16
This paper examines the debate over the issue of whether bioprospecting
or biopiracy within the WTO multilateral trade regime, and specifically under
TRIPS, undermines the interests of the developing countries. It likewise explores a
potential compromise or settlement within the framework of the WTO and outside
of it.
9 Paul J. Heald, Mowing the Playing Field: Addressing Infi;rmatWnand Asymrtry in the TRIPS Game, 88 MINN.
L. REv. 249 (2003 - 2004).
10 MARCDC. E. J. BRONCKERS,A CROSS·SECTIONOF wro LAW (2000) at 187- 188. See, e.g., Ernst·
Ulrich Petersmann, Ccnstit1ftionalism and Intemational ~ims, 17 NW.J. INT'!..L. & Bus. 398, 442 (1996 -
1997) characterizing agreements relating to services and intellectual property as part of "global package deals"
negotiated within the GAIT IWTO.
II Evelyn Su, The Winners and the Losers: the Agrrenmt 00 Trade·ReIauri Aspects of Intelka1fal Profxny RiiJt.'
and Its Effias on Deuioping Countries, 23 HOUSTONJ. INT'!..L. 169 (2000). Please see, Peter Drahos, DL'uJoping
wmtries and Intella:tual Profxny Standard· Setting, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 765, 769 . 770 (2002), who analysed
the 1RIPS negotiating history in detail and challenges the claim that the 1RlPS was the" result of bargaining
amongst sovereign and equal States ... " Also see, Susan K. Kell, TRIPS and the ACQ3s to Medicines CamJxtig-r,20
WIS. lNT'!.. L. J. 481 (2002), who states that "1RlPS was a product of tireless and effective agency and
economic coercion."
12 Milan Bulajic, A ChtuIfing Wm!d CallsjiJr IrztematimalIJez:elnpnmt Law, in PETAR SARCEVICAND HANS
VANHOUTTE (EDS.), LEGAL IsSUESIN INTERNATIONALTRADE 1 . 22 (1990).
n NECTARIA CALAN. GLOBALISING BIOPIRACY: INTELLECTUALPROPERTY RIGHTS, THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT,AND1HE APPROPRIATIONOF TRADITIONALKNOWLEDGE (2006).
14 Please see, for example, Paul J. Heald, TheRhetmiJ:of Biapiracy, 11 CARDOZOJ. INT'!.. & COM'. L. 518
(2003- 2004). .
" Frederick M. Abbot, The W70 TRIPS Agrrenmt and GIol::ulECCTI'107lK:IJez:elnpnmt, 72 CHI. KENT. L.
REv. 385 (1996 - 1997).
16 Valentina Tejera, TrippingOrer Profxny RiiPts: Is it Possible to RffmCile the CammtiO'l on BiologicalDir.:ersity
uith Artide 27 of the TRIPS Agrrenmt?, 33 NEW ENGLAND L. REv. 967, 987 (1999). She states that "[W]ithout
the protection afforded by intellectual property, economic incentives for spending millions of dollars on
research ... would not exist."
This paper aims to: first, briefly outline and examine the international legal
framework on the protection of intellectual property under the Agreement on
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) created within the
framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO); second, situate and discuss
the issue regarding the debate on bioprospecting or biopiracy as inimical to the
interests of the developing nations; third, provide analytical illustrations of recent
cases involving bioprospecting or biopiracy involving the patenting of biological
material from developing nations by the developed nations; and fourth, form an
informed position with respect to the issue posed and explore possible solutions
toward a compromise or settlement of the issue both primarily within the legal
framework of the WTO and outside of it.
A THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZA nON AND THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-
RELATED AsPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
The TRIPS Agreement is universally regarded as the most comprehensive
international agreement on intellectual property rightsY The TRIPS Agreement was
adopted within the framework of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, which incorporated for the first time, the protection of intellectual
property rights into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades (GATI}.18 The
TRIPS Agreement expands and builds upon the substantive obligations of the main
conventions of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),19 the Paris
17 For an overview of the 1RIPS A~reement, please see: CARLOSM. CORREAAND ABDULQAWIYUSUF
(EDs), lNrELLECTUAL PROPERTYAND INTERNATIONALTRADE: THE 1RIPs AGREEMENT (1998); CARLOS
M. CORREA, lNrELLECTUAL PROPERTYRIGHTS, THE WIO, AND DEVELOPING COI..NIRlES: THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS (1999); CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF
INTELLECll.lALPROPERTYRIGHrS: A COMMENTARYON TI-IETRIPS AGREEMENT(2006).
l' MARCO C. E. J. BRONCKERS,A CROSS-SECl'IONOF WIO LAW (2000) at 185. The only provision
under the ori~in:tl GATT A~reement of 1947 which substantively de:tlt with intellectu:tl property was Attic1e
XX(d), which provided that under cettain conditions, the contractin~ parties would be :tllowed to restrict trade
in ~oods to protec't intellectu:tl propetty. For a concise history of the GATT internation:tl tradin~ re~i.me,
please see: ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEMAND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (1990);
ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENfDRCING lNrERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:THE EVOLUTIONOF 11-[£ MODERN GATT
LEGAL SYSTEM(1993); PETER GALLAGHER, THE FIRST TEN YEARS OF TI-IE WID: 1995-2005 (2005);
TERENCEP. STEWART(ED), THE GATT URUGUAYROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY(1986-1992) (1993).
19 Please see, Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Propeny Organization, Jul. 14, 1967, 21
US.T. 1770, 1772-73, 828 UN.T.S. 3, 11, 13 [hereinafter WIPO CONVENTION). The World Intellectu:tl
Property Organization ("WIPO"), established in 1967 under the WIPO Convention, is an intergovernment:tl
organization with headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. Its objective is "the promotion of the protection of
intellectual propeny throughout the world through cooperation among States, and for the administration of
various multilater:tl treaties dealing with the legal and administrative aspects of intellectu:tl propeny." WIPO is
one of sD..1:eenspecialized divisions of the United Nations, and is responsible for the administration and
enforcement of the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention.
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Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (paris Convention)20 which
protects against trademark and patent infringement, and the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention)21 which protects
against copyright infringement.
The areas of intellectual property that it covers are: copyright and related
rights;22 trademarks including service marks; geographical indications including
appellations of origin; industrial designs; patents including the protection of new
varieties of plants; the layout-designs of integrated circuits; and undisclosed
information including trade secrets and test data.23
B. DEFINITION AND RATIONALE FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
Intellectual property is broadly defined as "creations of the mind:
inventions, literary and artistic works, and symbols, names, images, and designs used
in commerce. "24The objective behind the protection of intellectual property is the
promotion of intellectual creativity and innovation.25 This purportedly impels
scientific advancement by providing for incentives that reward intellectual activity
that produces innovation and that contribute to the common good.26
20 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, last revised at Stockholm,
Jul. 14, 1967,21 U.S.T. 1583,828 UN.T.5. 305 [hereinafter PARISCawENTION]. The Paris Convention is
one of the oldest international agreements on the protection of intellectual property rights. Its objective is to
provide" protection of industrial property .... The protection of industrial property has as its object patents,
utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, trade names, indications of source or appellations
of origin, and the repression of unfair competition." [Art. I, Paris Convention].
Please see, Article 2(1), 1RIPS AGREEMENT,supra note 2
21 BERNE CONVENTION was established September 9, 1886, entered into force on December 5, 1887,
and is codified at 331 U.N.T.S. 217. Please see, Article 9 (I), 1RIPS AGREEMENT, supra Note 2.
22 Related rights pertain to the rights of performers, producers of sound recordings and broadcasting
organizations. The 1RIPS Agreement does not contain a deftnition of "intellectual property" or of "trade-
related intellectual property rights" but the WIPO Convention in Article 2 (viii) deftnes the rights relating to
intellectual property. See, MIQ-lAEL BLAKENEY,TRADE RElATED ASPECfS OF INTELLECIUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: A CONCISE GUIDE TOmE TRIPs AGREEMENT10-20 (1996).
n Paul Edward Geller, IntdiatJlai Pruf»ty in the Glolul Marl¢plare.· /mptrt Of TRIPS Dispute Settkmmt, 29
INT'LLAw.99 (1995).
24 Online at World Intellectual Property Organization <http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/>. The
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that: "everyone has the right to the
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of
which he is the author." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted Dec. 10, 1948, GA. Res. 217A (III)
UN. Doc. No. A/810 at 27 (1948). For background general reading on intellectual property law, please see:
JILL MCKEOUGH, lNfELLECIUAL PROPERTY (1988); ANDREW CHRISTIE AND STEPHEN GARE,
INTELLECIUAL PROPERTY(2003); WILLIAMVAN CAENEGEM,INTELLECIUAL PROPERTY(2005)
2; Shanker A. Singham, 0mfx'Iitim Policy <VXi the Stimlliatim Of Innvwtim: TRIPS and the Intetfare
&tuxm 0mfx'Iitim <VXi Patent Prrm:tim in the Pharrntxattiat/ Industry, 26 BROOK.J. INT'L L. 363 (2000 - 2001).
26 Id. at 372. See DoNALD G. RIQ-IARDS, INTELLECIUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND GLOIlAL
CAPITALISM:THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF mE 1RIPS AGREEMENT 25 - 52 (2004), which provides
justiftcatory arguments in discussing the ideology of intellectual property.
The international agenda for the protection of intellectual property was
essentially a proposal from the developed nations.J7 Amidst serious oppositions
from developing countries, the TRIPS Agreement was adopted in Marrakesh,
Morocco on April 15, 1994 as part of the negotiations and agreements of the
Uruguay Round of GA TT.28 It came into force on January 1, 1995.29
In view of the status of the TRIPs Agreement as a multilateral agreement
under the wro system, a country that wishes to accede to the wro must also
agree to abide by the TRIPs Agreement. Currently, there are 151 countries
participating in the wro, and consequently, in the TRIPs Agreement)O
Interestingly, in terms of numbers, it is obvious that the developing (and least
developed) nations far outnumber the developed nations.31
The TRIPs Agreement, institutionalizes an international norm32 that
mirrors those currently used by developed countries, the United States in
particular)3 The TRIPS Agreement seeks to impose and universalize the levels and
forms of intellectual property protection existing in the North.34 Even conceptually,
it is reasonably apparent that intellectual property fits awkwardly into the context of
trade liberalization, which advances the removal of barriers to market competition,
" It was the United States, Japan, and the European Community which lobbied for the international
protection of intellectual property rights to be added to the agenda of the Uruguay Round of General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GAIT') in 1994, See for example, Robert J. Pechman, Sreking Multilmeral
Prot«tim fOr lntel1«nv.tl Profx7ty: The United States 7R1Ps' Ow- Sptrial301, 7 MINN. J. GLcnAL TRADE 179, 183
(1998). Also, MEIR PEREZ PuGATO-I, THE INTERNATIONALPOLITICAL EmNOMY OF INTELLECIUAL
PROPERTIRJGHTS 156 (2004).
28 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss and Andreas F. Lowenfield, Too Achiewrmts if the Un'iJtay ROllnd:Plltting
TRIPS andDispllteSettfmmt T~, 37 VA.J. 1m'LL 275 (1996-1997).
29 Please see for additional information, wro 11UPS Materials on the wro Site. Online at:
<http://www.wto.org/englisli/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_e.htm>.
}01be wro has 151 members, as of 27 July 2007. Online at: World Trade Organization
<http://www.wto.org/english/theMo_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm> .
.1\ Id.
12 The TRIPS, however, does not impose a "universal" set of intellectual property protection rules. In
fact, Article 1 provides:
Members shall give effeL"tto the provisions of this Agreement. Members may,
but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is
required by this Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the
provisions of this Agreement. Members shall be free to detertnine the appropriate
method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal
''Ystem and practice.
}} Stefan Kirchanski, Prrm:tim if U.S. Paten Rigxs in Dw:loping Catntries: U.S. EjJOrts To EnjJJre
~tticalPatmt5 in 7bailarJ, 16 Lay. LA. INT'L&CoMP. LJ. 569 (1994).
H Leanne M. FeL"teau, The A)UhtfIJr<dPaten Reum!im.' Raising Q6tims About Ommt U.S. Pdtmt Niy, 21
B.C. 1H1RD WORLD L. J. 69, 78 (2001). Please note that in the context of the wro, North-South refers to
debates or disputes between developed and developing countries, while North-North refers to debates or
disputes between developed countries, and South-South refers to debates or disputes between developing
countries.
as opposed to intellectual property protection which establishes private rights to
prevent market competition.
D. A SURVEY OF MAIN PROVISIONS PERTINENT TO THE PATENTING OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY
A patent is a right granted to the originator of an invention that is new,
useful, and not-obvious. The patent grants the inventor, in return for its disclosure
to the public, the exclusive rights to make, use, or sell the invention for a specified
period.35 The general protection of intellectual property rights through patents is
contained in Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement, which provides: "patents shall be
available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of
industrial application. "36
This protection is subject to the generally accepted principles of national
treatment37 and most favored nation treatment.38 In particular, the protection to
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products is outlined in Article 70.8 of the
TRIPS Agreement.39 This Article provides for the protection of these products
even during the transitional period incOIporated into the TRIPs Agreement for
developing and least developed countries40 to attain the appropriate infrastructure
to support compliant IPR regimes.41
The TRIPS Agreement, in Article 27.2, provides for the right of member
states to exclude from patentability inventions whose commercial use would
jeopardize the "ordre publif: or morality" of their state. This broadly covers the
exclusion of certain inventions from patentability in order to "protect human,
animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment. "42 In
addition, Article 27 .3 (b) allows member states to exclude the following from
patentability:
)S Please see, Pollyanna E. Folkins, Has tlx! Lab G.l:lt Bwme the Modem day Eye Patch? 7bumting BitJpiracyof
I~ Resourcesby Malifying Intematilm:J/Patmting SystRms, 13 TRANSNAT'LL. & CONIEMP. PROBS. 339
(2003).
)6 Art. 27.1, lRIPs AGREEMENT, supra note 2. The terms "inventive step" and "capable of industrial
application" are considered synonymous with the requirements of non-obviousness and usefulness.
)7 See Art. 27, lRIPs AGREEMENT, supra note 2. It provides that: "patents shall be available and patent
rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether
products are imported or locally produced.»
)8 Article 4, Id..
)9 Article 70.8, lRIPS AGREEMENT, Id.
40 Articles 65 - 67,lRIPS AGREEMENT,Id.
41 Developed countries had until Janu;uy 1, 1996 to implement the lRIPS obligations. Developing
countries have an additional period of 4 years for implementation (i.e., untilJanu;uy 1, 2000). Least developed
countries were not be required to apply lRIPS provisions on intellectual property rights until 2006; i.e., 10
years from the date of application for developed countries. These time frames do not include obligations
concerning national treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment, which became applicable in 1996. This
reflects the social and economic significance of pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products, as well as a
recognition of the need for IPR protection of these products.
42 Article 27.2, lRIPS AGREEMENT, supra note 2.
plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially
biological processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-
biological and microbiological processes. However, Members shall provide
for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective
suigr.neris system or by any combination thereof.43
This is the most relevant article in relation to biotechnology in the TRIPS
Agreement. It must be noted, however, that the above terms (i.e.,micro-organisms,
biological processes, non-biological and microbiological processes) used in Article
27.3(b) are not defined in the 1RIPs Agreement and are thus subject to national
interpretation.44 The sweeping and vague language of Article 27.3(b) evinces a
provisional middle ground among the many competing interests on the sensitive
issue of biotechno10gy.45
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)4(,is the ftrst multilateral
treaty regime that addressed the issue of preserving the planet's biological
resourcesY It is also the first convention to establish the sovereign right of a state
over its natural resources, 4Nand its responsibility to facilitate access to those
41 Article 17.3 (a) provides for the exclusion of "diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the
treatment of humans or animals." The provisions of Article 27.3 (b) shall be reviewed four years after the date
of entry into force of the wro Agreement. Article 27.3, 1RIPS AGREEMENT, supra note 1.
H Carrie P. Smith, Patmting Lije: thc Prxmtial fD'Id the Pitfalls of Using the WTO ro GlOO:tli2e Inte!la:tJ1d1 Profx!rty
Rip, 26 N.C.J.INT'LL. & COM. REG. 143 (2000).
" The inclusion of an early revision date for these provisions aanuary 1999) highlights the provisional
nature of this compromise. In fact, this is the only article in the entirety of the 1RIPS Agreement subject to an
early revision - a special treatment that again indicates the controversial nature of these issues. The framers of
this Article anticipated a negotiated revision of the terms of Article 27.3(b) as the primary way of resolving
this controversy. A.darification of these nebulous terms can likewise be made through the use of the wro's
administrative committees and dispute settlement procedures. See, for instance, Arts. 63, 64, TRIPS
AGREEMENT, supra note 1.
'6 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, 1991, 1760 UNTS 79; 31 ILM 818, opened for
signature 5 June 1991, entered into force 19 December 1993. Online at: <http://www.biodiv.org>. The CBD
was opened at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the Rio "Earth Summit").
[Hereinafter CBD CONVENTION] For academic literature on the relation of intellectual property and the
Convention on Biological Diversity, please see: CHARLESR. MCMANIS(ED), BIODIVERSITYAND TI-IELAW:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, BIOTEGlNOLOGY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE (1007); NATAUE P.
STOIANOFF, (ED)ACCESSING BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES: COMPLYING Wm-J 1HE CONVENTION ON
BIOLOGICALDIVERSITY(2004); CHRISTOPHE BELLMANN,GRAHAMDlJIFIELD ANDRICARDOMELENDEZ-
ORTIZ (eds) , TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE, AND
SUSTAINAIlILITY(1003); PHILIPPE G. LE PRESTRE (ED), GOVERNING GLOBAL BIODIVERSI1Y: THE
EVOLlrrION AND IMPLEMENTATIONOF '[HE CawENTION ON BIOLOGICALDIVERSITY(1001); GRAHAM
Dln1'IELD, INTELLECTUALPROPERTYRIGI-lTS,TRADE AND BIODIVERSITY:SEEDSAND PLANf VARIETIES
(1000).
" See Amanda Hubbard, thc Gmmtim on BioIu;jcalDir=iry's Fifth Anniz.mary: A G01<.'ml Ou.'I'liLw if t!X'
Qmmtim· Where Has if &mfD'ld W1nt'is it Going, 10 TUL ENVT'L L.J. 415, 419 (1997).
" The sovereign authority of a State over its own natural resources is subject to the responsibility it mm,
not use its resources in a way that will cause damage to the environment of other States or to areas beyond the
limits of their national jurisdiction. See Articles 3, 10, CBD CONVENTION. Also TRAIL SMELTER CASE
(UNITED STATESV. CANADA.), 3 R.I.AA. 1911 (1941) which establishes this responsibility under principles
of customary international law.
resources.49 The Convention seeks towards "the conservation of biological
diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing
of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources."SO
While some legal scholars have argued that there is an actual or potential
conflict between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD,Sl it is beyond the scope of
this paper, and will thus not be addressed.
The contentious provisions of the CBD which have a bearing on
intellectual property rights are contained in Article 15, which governs access to
genetic resources;S2 Article 16, which promotes access to and transfer of technology
derived from the research and development of genetic material;S3 and Article 19,
which requires "participating countries to pass legislation guaranteeing that biotech
companies share the results and benefits of their research and development with
genetic resource provider countries." The CBD accords a country the right to direct
compensation for materials taken and to part of the income generated from any
resulting products. S4 Article 15 of the CBD is a departure from the traditional
notion that genetic material belongs to the public domain, which is one reason
industrialized nations have plundered the resources of the developing world without
compensation to the latter .
•9 Please see, Robin L. Scon, Bio-Cazserwticn or Bio-Exploitatim: An Analysis of theAetite Ingraiimts Diswwy
Agmnmt &tuxm Brazilian Institutim BIOAMAZONIA and the Swiss Pharmr:miti1:alNau:mis, 35 GEO. WASH.
INT'LL.REv. 977 (2003).
,0 Article 1, CBD CONVENTION, supra note 46. Article 2 deftnes "biological diversity" as "the variability
among living organisms from all sources," and "sustainable use" as "the use of components of biological
diversity in a way and at a rate that does not lead to [their] long-term decline."
,1 Charles R. McManis, The Inter/are &turen Intemat:iooalintelkrtuaJ Property and Emirrnnmtal Prour:tim:
BiaJiwsityand B~, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 255 (1998); Valentina Tejera, Tripping Ow- PropertyRiiPts: Is It
Possible To Rff.UKile The Ccrnmticn OJ BinIugjadDn=ity With Article 27 Of The TRIPS AgrtHOO1t?,33 NEW
ENGLAND L. REv. 967 (1999); Meetali Jain, GW Trade and the New MilJenniJlm'Defining the SCOfX!of InteUeauaJ.
Pro[»tyPrmttimofPIant Gmt1icRe5IJU1U3andTrttditit:nal~in/ndia, 22 HAsTINGSINT'L &COMP. L. REv.
777 (1999); Muria Kruger, Hrnm:nizing TRIPS and the CBD: a Proposalfirm India, 10 MINN. J. GLOBALTRADE
169 (2001).
,2 It states that "the authority to determine access to genetic resources rests with the national
governments and is subject to national legislation." Nations with genetic resources must facilitate access by
other nations while those countries or private companies which seek to utilize the resources must take
measures to share in a "fair and equitable way" the benefits arising from the R&D of those resources. Article
15, CBD CONVENTION, supra note 46.
,J The Article states that "both access to and transfer of technology among Contracting Parties are
essential elements for the attainment of the objectives of this Convention." Contracting parties are mandated
to pass legislation to grant provider countries rights to the technology that makes use of the genetic material.
In this manner, intellectual property rights in the technology in question will not interfere with the transfer of
the technology. Article 16, CBD CONVENTION, supranote 46.
" Elizabeth Longacre, Adwndng Scimce WWe Protating Der:8oping Countries firm ExploiJatim of 7beir
ResourresandKnauJHil:f, 13 FORDHAMlNTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT; L.J. 963, 976 - 977 (2003).
-Martin Khor, Director of
Third World Neru:ork55
The exploration and utilization of biological material for the extraction of
anything of potential value to medicine, agriculture, cosmetics or industry, preceded
the creation of the wrOY' Recently, this has been referred to as: bioprospecting,
biotechnology, chemical prospecting, gene-hunting, or natural product research,57
or the politically-loaded term, "biopiracy."58 The variance in terminology, however,
does not suggest that the idea is nove1.S9
The debate is certainly not simple. Perhaps, at its core, albeit somewhat a
peripheral issue, is the nagging apprehension of the developing world, v:rith some
vestiges of their colonial experience, that they are being taken advantage of, or
exploited by the developed nations.GO
A. GLOBAL PATENT ENFORCEMENT: TAKING ADVANTAGE OF
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES UNDER THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
Throughout history, the dynamics of the relationship between developed
and developing countries have always been one of "chicanery, selfishness and
exploitation."!'! To the developing world, biopiracy, or the misappropriation, nay
theft, of genetic material and indigenous knowledge from developing countries, is
merely a new name to an old process. The strategy of industrialized countries
towards the global liberalization of trade in an aim to dominate the world market is
" Martin I<1ur, Di.ra:trJrof7birr1 worU Netwak Online at: Christian Aid. <http://www.christianaid.org.ukI
campaign/ resource/ quotes.htrn#poveny >.
56 Sean D. Murphy, BiotnJJndng;yand Intenu1timtJl.Law, 42 HARV. INr'L L. J. 47 (2001). See also, Yvonne
Cripps, Patenting Resourrr:.s:B~ am the 0nP{x of Sustainalie Deuiopnent, 9 INDIANA J. GLOBALLEGAL
STIJDIES119 (2001).
57 Corliss Karasov, W1xJ Reaps the BenejiJsif BUxliuniry?, 109 ENVIRONMENTALHEALlli PERSPECTIVES
582 (2001). Online at: Environmental Health Perspectives < http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/docs/200l/109-
12/focus.htrnl>
58 Erin Kathleen Bender, Narth and South: The W7D, TRIPs, and the ~ of Biopirtey, 11 TuLsA J. COMPo
& INr'L L. 281 (2003). See for example, David R. Downes, How InteIIe:tud Prop?rty 0Juld re a Tad to PretH1
Traditimal Knouialg; COLUM. J. ENVf'I... L. 253, 263 (2000), who argues that "[t]he 'piracy' slogan is
misleading. "
59 Young-Gyoo Shim, InteIIe:tud Prop?rtyProtmim of BiotnJJndng;yand Sustdinable DeuioJmmt. in IrrterrI4tio1d
Law, 29 N.C.J. INr'LL. & COM. REG. 157, 160 (2003).
60 See for example, discussion in Walden Bello and Anuradha Mittal, The Metming of Doha, 24/25
Southern Bulletin (2001) 7. Online at: South Centre <http://www.southcentre.org/info/southbulletin/
bulletin24-25/bulletin24-25.pdf> .
61 Remigius N. Nwabueze, Ethnophatrna:nln, Patmts and the PoIi1ics of PLmts' GeJ1i1ic Resources, 11
CARDozo J. INr'I... COMPoL. 585, 590 (2003).
highly reffillllscent of the exploitation and exercise of ownership rights by the
developed countries of the Western world over the South during the era of
colonization.62
Albeit admittedly much simplified, it is in this problematically turbulent
context that the interplay of the inherent tension between the North and the South
is best demonstrated. However, the hostility of developing countries against 1RIPS
does not spring solely on account of their perception that it is a western imposition.
The problems it poses defmitely are more than theoretical.6J
B. THE EXPLOITATION OF INDIGENOUS AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES
THROUGH THE USE OF THEIR NATURAL RESOURCES AND TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE
It is argued that stringent IP laws are a precursor to foreign investment,
and are thus, an incentive for developing countries.64 This emphasizes the role of
foreign capital investment from the developed nations as a critical factor for long-
term economic growth.65 The argument seems at best, unpersuasive, if not a
complete sham.
On a contrary point, it has been advanced that the main international
agreements from the Uruguay Round - TRIPS, 1RIMS and GATS - systematically
tip the playing field against developing countries.66 It is a clear case of double-speak.
62 Please see, for example, TAlMOON STEWART,THE n-nRD Wcron DEBT CRISIS:A CONI1NUITY OF
IMPERIALISM(2002). For academic literature on biopiracy from a developing countl}' perspective, please see:
VANDANA SHIVA, BIOPIRACY:THE PLUNDER OF NAWRE AND KNOWLDEGE (1997); SURENDER SINGH
CHAUHAN, BIODIVERSITY,BIOPIRACY,AND BIOPOLITICS:THE GWBAL PERSPECTIVE(2001); VANDANA
SHIVA, PROTECT OR PLUNDER?: UNDERSTANDING INTEllECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2001); GRAHAM
DUTFIELD, INTEllECTUAL PROPERTY,BIOGENETICRESOURCES,AND'TRADITIONALKNOWLEDGE (2004);
K. C. AGRAWAL,GWBAL BIODIVERSITY:CoNSERVATION, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND BIOPIRACY(2002);
IKECHI MADUKA MGBEOJI, GWBAL mOPIRACY: PATENTS, PLANTS, AND INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE
(2006); A. MUSHITA AND CAROL B. THOMPSON, BIOPIRACYOF BIODIVERSITY:GLOBAL EXO-lANGE AS
ENClDSURE (2006)
6) Shubha Ghosh, Globdiwioo, Patents, am Traditimal KI'IOUiai~, 17 COLUM.J. ASIANL. 73 (2003).
64 Carsten Fink and Carlos A. Primo Braga, Haw Stra'IW Proto:tim of Intdkallal ProfXYtY Rig,ts AfJim
Intematimal Trade Flaws, in CARsTEN FINK AND KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH 19 - 40 (2005). They argue that stronger
IPRs have a significantly positive effect on total trade. See especially, Keith E. Maskus, '"lk Rde of Intelkaual
Property R~ in EncDllraging FareigI Dirrrt Im:estnmt tmd T~ Tranrfrr, in FINK AND MASKUS, il:id., at 41 -
74. See for example, Alireza Naghavi, Strategic Intd1atual Property Rig,rs Policy tmd North-South T~ Tranrfrr.
Online at: The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro Series Index
<http://www.feem.it/FeemlPublPublicationslWPapers/defauh.htrn>. who argues that stringent IPR
regime is always optimal for developing countries as it triggers technology transfer by inducing FDI in less
R&D·intensive 'industries and stimulates innovation by pushing multinationals to deter entl}' in high-
technology sectors
(,; Kimberly A. Czub, A~tinas Emerging Standan:J of Intelketual Property Prot£aim: A Case Study of tl~
Underlying Onj/iets lx'tUX.m n.~ QN/ntries, TRIPS Standards, and rk Unitai States, 33 CASEW. REs. J. INT'L L.
191,202 (2001).
(,(,Robert Hunter Wade, Wb:tt stratLb>U3are 'liable fUr deu10ping OOImtnes taLry? The W,nfd Trade Ori,unizdtion
and rk shrinking of 'dewOJ7t1mt space: CRISISSTATESPROGRAMMEWORKING PAPER No. 31, Jlme 2003, at 2.
Online at: <hnp:l /www.crisisstates.com/download/wpIWP31RW.pdf>
The US and European Union (EU) demand others to open up markets for free
trade but have kept large parts of their own economies off the negotiating table and
have avoided commitments to improve market access for developing countries.67
The truth is, this development agenda was not the formula followed by now-
developed economies.68 The argument is a legal and economic curiosity for being
almost devoid of historical basis. 69
Indeed, there is a very fine line between patenting and piracy. The
following four examples, are illustrative of this conflict between the industrialized
and the developing world over the ownership and/or patenting of biological
material.
Basmati rice is a traditional Pakistani and Indian food staple and export. In
1997, RiceTec, a Texas-based company, was awarded several patents on the basmati
rice and grain lines. The governments of India and Pakistan have challenged the
patents on the ground of lack of novelty. In 2001, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office rescinded fifteen of the twenty patents granted to RiceTec.
However, RiceTec still holds patent 484, which permits it to exclude others from
making, using and selling its patented basmati rice in the United States until
September 2017.7°
67 /d FRANCESCO FRANCIONI AND 1ULuo SOOVAZZI. (EDS.), BIOTECI-INOLOGY AND
INTERNATIONALLAw 367 - 438(2006), which discuss the issue of biotechnology and regional economic
integration specifically in the EU context. See also, CHRISTOPHERMAYAND SUSANK. SELL, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTYRIGHfS: A CRlTICALHISTORY(2005).
68 Please see. HA-JOON O-IANG AND DUNCAN GREEN, THE NORTHERN wro AGENDA ON
INVESTMENT:Do ASWE SAY, NOT AS WE DID (2003). They argue that almost all of the now-developed
countries direc"tly imposed restrictions on the entry of foreign investment; even providing for its ban for
certain sectors or allowed entry on certain conditions (e.g. requirements for joint ventures, ceilings on foreign
ownership). The following quote is most instructive:
Our historical survey shows that in successful economies, only when domestic industry had
reached a certain level of sophistication, complexiry, and competitiveness did the benefits of non-
discrimination and liberalization come to outweigh the costs. As a result, countries have generally
moved towards a greater degree of non-Discrimination and liberalization as they develop. In that
sense, non-discrimination is better seen as an atta:me of development, not a cause, and therefore an
MIA founded on this principle is likely to harm the developing countries' prospects for
development.ld. at 4.
(,9 /d at 39.
70 Sumathi Subbiah. Reaping W1m 71xy Sow The Basnurti RiJ:eCootnJw"Sy and Strat~>Usfor Prvt<Wng Traditimal
Knauklg?, 27 B.C. lNT'L & COMPoL. REv. 529 (2004); Erin Donovan, Bemzs, Bemzs, the Patmtal. Fmit: 771('
Grouing /ntema.timal Cooflia OU'Y the Oun<7Yhipof Life, 25 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMPoL. REv. 117 (2002); Michael
Woods, Foodfor 17xJr"iPt: The Biopiracy ofJa.mine and Basmt.tti RiJ:e, 13 AUlANY L. J. SCr. & TEa-r. 123 (2002); See
also, Jolayemi Adewumi, Basmati. Online at: Trade and Environment Database
<lutp:l /www.american.edu/projects/mandalaITED/basmati.htm>. RiceTec calls its aromatic rice sold
within the US as "Basmati" and has tried to export Basmati-type rice, with the same label. This threatens to
adversely affect Indian and Pakistani exports. See also, UZMA JAMIL, BIOPIRACY: THE PATENTING Or-
BASMATI IlYRICETEC (1998); PETER PRINGLE, FOOl), INC.: MENDEL TO MON;ANTo- THE PRGvlISESAND
PERILSOF TI-IEBIOTECHHARVEST79-95 (2003).
The patent to the Enola Bean, also known as the Mayacoba bean in
Mexico, was granted to Colorado bean industIy executive Larry Procter, after
allegedly cultivating yellow beans he bought in Mexico on vacation two years prior
to his patent application. The company of Procter, Pod-Ners, does not deny that its
Enola bean, is a descendant of the traditional Mexican bean from the Andes, the
Mayacoba, but insists that it has a distinctive yellow color and a more consistent
shape. The patent, as well as the u.s. Plant Variety Protection Certificate, Procter
was able to secure, gave him a legal monopoly over yellow beans sold in the United
States. The patent allows him to sue anyone in the United States who sells or grows
a bean that he considers to be his particular shade of yellow. In addition, Procter
profits from yellow beans imported from Mexico by imposing on them a six cent-
per-pound royalty. This has resulted to great economic hardship for farmers both in
the United States and particularly in Northern Mexico. 71
Turmeric, a tropical herb grown in East India, has long been used in
Indian traditional medicine. It is also used as a food dye and flavoring as well as an
ingredient in medicines and cosmetics. In 1995, the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) awarded to the University of Mississippi Medical Center in 1995, a
patent72 for the use of powdered turmeric, particularly the "use of turmeric in
wound healing." 73
A challenge was filed by the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research
(CIR) of India arguing that the patent failed the legal requirement of novelty
because the long usage of turmeric to heal woUnds was prior art. It presented
Indian publications, including ancient Sanskrit writings, that documented turmeric's
extensive and varied use throughout India's history. In 1997, the patent was
revoked.
The neem tree (AzadiradJta indira) is a tropical evergreen, related to the
mahogany, that mainly grows in arid regions of India and Burma and Southwest
Asia and West Africa. It has been used for hundreds of years by the rural people in
71 Gillian N. Ranray, The Enola &tm Patent Ontrotmy: BiopirtKY, Nauity and Fish and-Chips, 8 DUKE L. &
TErn. REV. 1 (2002); Erin Donovan, &ans, Beans, the PatmtHi Fnlit: The Growing Intematimal CanjIia OW" the
0unerYJip of Lift, 25 Lay. LA. !Nil. & CCMP. L. REv. 117 (2002); Gillian N. Rattray, Th Enola Bean Patmt
Ontrotmy: Biopiracy, Nauity and Fish-and-OJips, DUKE L. & TErn. REv. 8 (2002); Danielle Goldberg, Jack and
the Enola Bean, online at: Trade and Environment Database Case Studies
<http://www.american.edulTED/ enola-bean.htrn>.
72 The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (IYfO) granted patent No. 5,401,504 for the use of powdered
turmeric to speed the healing of wO\ll1ds
73 Please see, Alyson Slack, Turmeric. Online at: Trade and Environment Database Case Studies
<lm:p:/ / eagle l.american.edul" as 1440afTIJRMERIC.htm>. Also, Downes, supra note 58 at 258, 278.
India for a variety of uses ranging from toothpaste to pesticide. In 1971, a timber
company in the United States, having heard of the neem tree's usefulness in acting
as a pesticide, began planting neem tree seeds and applied for and was granted a
patent. In 1988, the patent was sold to the US based company W.R. Grace, which
secured exclusive rights in 1992 to an emulsion formula derived from the seeds of
the neem tree to make a powerful pesticide. It likewise sued many Indian
companies for making the emulsion.74
The U.S. Company, W.R. Grace, was able to secure the patents over a
number of inventions relating to the neem tree.75 The neem tree itself, or its seeds,
being a product of nature is not patentable, and in fact, no patent has been issued
over the neem tree or its seeds. However, it stands to reason that the "inventions"
relating to the neem tree drew upon traditional knowledge and practices in India [as
well as to Western practices in the public domain] without proper compensation to
their individual or collective originators.76
There are several noted scholars who have written, theorized and
publicized what has been termed as the "Great Seed Rip-Off" - international
conventions that grant plant breeders' rights allowing commercial plant breeders to
use traditional indigenous varieties of seeds and improve them via minor genetic
alterations, and then receive patents in the varieties?7 These seeds eventually find
their way back to the developing world that produced them initially after the
multinational firms from the industrialized world sells them back.78
" Please see, Sara Hasan, tbe NCltn Tire, Emin:nmmt, OIItUlf! and InteUiUual Property. Online at: Tcade and
Environment Dataluse Case Studies. < http://www.american.eduITED/neemtree.htm> . Also, Downes, supra
note 58 at 180 - 181. Also, Emily Marden, tbe Neen Trre Patent: IntLmatimal Omjlia mer the Ccmrnlijit:atim If
Life, 21 B.C. INT'L & COMPoL. REV. 179 (1999); Shayana Kadidal, Subjat·Matter Im{X!Yialism· Bialiwrsity, ForcilJ1
Prim A rt and the Num PatentOntrowry, 37 IDEA 371 (1996·1997).
" In 1990, a U.S. patent was awarded to WR. Grace which covers a technique for improving the storage
stability of neem seed extraL"tScontaining azadirachtin. In 1994, another patent was obtained by Grace which
covers a storage-stable insecticidal composition including a neem seed that had increased stability. Downes,
supra note 58 at 180 - 181.
76 Downes, ld.
77 J. M. SpeL'tar, IntcUatual PraJx?rtyDilmmas in the Biotah Drmain & Trwtmmt Equity fOr U'Uioping wmtnes,
14 HOUSTON J. lNT'L L. 117, 136 (1001). See also, E. Jane Gindin, Maca: Trt1ditimal KnauJnig; New World
Online at: Trade and Environment Database Case Studies <lnp:/ /www.american.edu/ted/maC3.htm>.Fora
more recent literature, please see: Christiane Gerstener et al, The lntematimal T ro:ttyl7I Plant Gm<.tic Resollrm fill"
Foal and AgrialltJl7cuithin the Ommt Legal Regime Ccmfiex l7I Plant Gcndic Re5()fI1U!S. 10 J. WORlD IN1HL. PROP.
159 - 183 (1007), which investigates the legal relationships between the International Treaty on Plant Genetic
Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA), which entered into force in 2004, on the one hand, and the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, the Union for the ProteL'tion of New
Varieties of Plants and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) on the other. It arrives at the
conclusion that there are no conflicts between the ITPGRF A and any of those treaties at present, while
negotiations conducted currently in the framework of the World IntelleL'tual Property Organization and the
CBD need carefully to avoid creating such legal conflicts.
78 Donovan, supra 70 at 140 citing Vandana Shiva, GA IT, AgrialltJl7c and Thin! W,nJ 1Vt"'''''
ECOFEMINISM231,240 (1996).
Thus, there are clear economic costs to the exploitation of the genetic and
biological resources of the Third World by the industrialized world..79 The dispute is
far from being theoretical. The cash-strapped developing world loses billions .of
dollars annually, in terms of lost revenue.80 In addition, the costs of enforcing their
obligations domestically under the TRIPS Agreement are likewise not
insignificant.81 Even in instances where countries from the developing world
legitimately feel that their intellectual property rights have been violated, the costs
of launching patent litigation can be prohibitive.
As a starting point, there is an obvious imperative to recognize the
structural imbalances in the global economy. The ubiquitous balancing act in the
entirety of the TRIPS Agreement resulting from the call to harmonize the interests
of the developed and developing nations is captured in the declared objective of the
TRIPs Agreement:
the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and
users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.82
The proposals below are not original in any way. In fact, they have been
tried or are currently in effect in some parts of the globe. In a manner of speaking,
these arrangements, short of tearing apart the framework of the TRIPS Agreement,
which is likely impossible to happen, merely temper its application or cushion its
negative impact, especially upon developing countries.
A DOCUMENTING TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND USE OF INDIGENOUS
GENETIC RESOURCES AS PRIOR ART
Traditional knowledge (TK), which is sometimes also referred to as
indigenous knowledge and local knowledge, generally refers to the matured long-
standing traditions and practices of certain regional, indigenous, or local
communities. It may include the wisdom, knowledge, and teachings of these
communities, orally passed for generations from person to person, expressed
79 Mary Lynne Kupchella, AgriaJtural BiotiLtndngy: W1Jy It em SaLe the Emin:n1rmt and Deui.ofing Natitns,
But May Ner:er G! a 0Jance, WM. & MARy ENVT'L L & POL'y REV. 721 (2001). See also, Peter A. Zakrzewski,
BioposJXr:tillgor Biopiracy? The Pharrnr:K:HttiaJiIndustry~ Use of /ndiwu1S Medicinal Plants as a Source of Potmtial Dntg
Candidates, 79U. TORONTO MEDICALJOURNAL252 (2002).
80 TWM, BioPiracy a-ts Deudoping Cmntries and their IntiifplCtlS Prop/es of $5.4 Billion a Yoo- in Plant and
I<nauIa:4FRIJ)KJ1ties, Says Study On:itaai for UNDP. Online at: TWM < http://twm.co.nz/Biopiracy.html> .
81 Peter M. Gerhart, Ref/«:ticns: &y:nd ~ 71xury-.TRIPS as a SuhstantiLe Issue, 32 Case W. REs. l-
INT'!. L. 357,358 (2000).
82 Anicle 7, 1RIPS AGREEMENT, supra nore 2
through stories, legends, folklore, rituals, songs, and even laws.83 The determinative
criterion that makes knowledge "traditional" is not its antiquity but its character as
being a vital, dynamic part of the contemporary lives of communities.84
A traditional knowledge registry, such as that attempted in India and
Australia,85 that documents traditional knowledge and practices would likely
facilitate the establishment of a prior art86 for any invention that is based on
traditional knowledge. A Registry of Traditional Knowledge should be put in place
and the appropriate domestic legislation enacted to accord special intellectual
property-like protection to traditional knowledge and genetic resources.87
Moreover, the UNESCOIWIPO Model Provisions for National Laws on
the Protection of Expressions of Folklore against Illicit Exploitation and Other
Prejudicial Actions 88offers analogous statutory protection of traditional knowledge
and genetic resources.89 The Model Provisions, although they address and ensure
" For literature discussing the debate on the protection of traditional knowledge and intellecrual
property, please see: Stephen B. Brush, Prote:tingTradirioud Agriailtural Knau.Ie:lfI!,17 W A~. U. J. L. & POL'y
59 (2005); Shubha Ghosh, Refkrtims on tk Tradirioud KnaultrifI! DeWte, 11 CAROOW JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONALAND COMPARATIVELAW 497 (2003-2004); Sarah Harding, Defining Tradirioud KnauJaifI! .
Lessons frrm O,ltural Property, 11 CARDOZO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONALAND COMPARATIVELAW 511
(2003-2004); Gerard Bodek.er, Traditimal Maiical Knooi«i[J!, Intelk::tual Property Rirfxs dJ1dBmtfit Sharing, 11
CAROOw JOURNALOF INTERNATIONALAND CCMPARATIVELAW 785 (2003-2004); Charles R. McManis,
InteLJiLtualProperty, Gmift ResourcesdJ1d Tmditimal KnaultrifI! Prot.u:tim.. Thinking Gldul1y, Aaing Locally, 11
CAROOWJOURNALOF INTERNATIONl\LANDCCMPARATIVELAW547 (2003-2004).
" WORLD INTELLECTIJAL PROPERTY OFFICE, INTELLECTIJAL PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE WIPO, PunLICATION No. 920(E) at 5, 6. Online at:
<Imp:! /www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/tk/920/wipo_ pub _920.pdf> The WIPO publication
enumerates some examples of traditional knowledge: Thai traditional healers use plao·na to treat ulcers; the
San people use Ixxxiia cactus to stave off hunger while out hunting; sU~1:ainableirrigation is maintained through
traditional water; systems such as the afkj in Oman and Yemen, and the qanttt in Iran; Cree and Inuit maintain
unique bodies of knowledge of seasonal migration patterns of particular species in the Hudson Bay region;
indigenous healers in the western Amawn use the A)ttbttaSCa vine to prepare various medicines, imbued with
sacred properties.
8, The various policy documents advocating special protection for indigenous knowledge in Australia
can be profitably read on: http://www.icip.lawnet.com.au/ch18.html.
86 It must be noted, however, that under Section 102 of U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.s.e. 102, use in a foreign
country is not recognized as a foreign art, except it is in a published form. This will exclude a great deal of
traditional knowledge, which is transmitted orally and inter-generationally.
87 Access to the Registry might be reasonably restricted and governed by a Material Transfer Agreement,
which binds the innovator of a derivative product to make stipulated compensation to the custodians of such
knowledge. In these ways, the efficacy and advantages of a formal registry system cannot be doubted, but at
the expense of the anglicization of traditional knowledge. Please see generally, Nwabueze, supra note 61 at 620
- 621. See comprehensive discussion of traditional knowledge in: Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, TRIPS and
Tradirioud Kn~ Loed Qrrmunities, Loed Knooi«i[J!, and G!ob:JJ. Intelk:tual Property Frt1111f!lWYks, 10 MARQ.
INTELL.PROP. L. REv. 155 (2006). Also see, Rhys Manely, IJer.elopnmtd Perspa:tiu.5Q1 tlx! TRIPs and Traditimal
J<nauia4FDeWte, 3 MAcx;JUARIEJ. INT'L & CCMP. ENV'L L. 113 (2006).
88 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Model Provisions for National
Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit Exploitation and other Prejudicial AC1:ions,
1982, available at http://www.wipo.org/traditiona1knowledge/ pdf/ 1982.folklore-modelprovisions.
89 See Harriet Fran Hunt, Afriran Folklore: The Role of 0Jpyri#t, 1 AAUCAN LEGAL STUDIES 87 (1969-
1972), as cited by Nwabueze, supra note 61. The article discusses earlier attempts in the late 60s to draft the
Model Provisions and its potential benefits for African countries.
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special copyrightability of folklore, its framework is potentially applicable to
ethnobotanical knowledge that are equally in need of protection.90
B. REQUIRING GEOGRAPHICAL INDICA nONS OF ORIGIN AND PRIOR
INFORMED CONSENT FOR PATENT ApPROVAL91
The TRIPS Agreement defmes "geographical indications" as "indications
which identify a good as originating in the territory of a [WTO] Member, or a
region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other
characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin." 92
The states parties to TRIPS must proscribe the registration of trademarks that are
misleading as to their geographic origin. Additionally, legalprocedures for interested
parties to prevent competitors from placing designations on their products that
mislead the public about their geographic origin, must be put in place.93
The TRIPS Agreement provides for additional protection of geographical
indications for wine and spiritS.94 The obligations regarding geographical
indications, however, are subject to a number of exceptions that may render them
less effective as a means of protecting traditional knowledge.95 Geographical
indications and trademms benefit consumers by providing them with reliable
information and assurances of authenticity.96
Geographical indications, as opposed to patents and copyrights, are not
specifically designed to reward innovation. Rather, they can operate to maintain
traditional knowledge and practices by rewarding producers that are situated in a
certain region and that follow production practices associated with that region and
90 Id.
91 Please see, Nuno Pires de Carvalho, Retpiring Disclosure of the Origin of Genttic Resourr:esand Prior InfmmJ.
CD7stnt in Patmt Applicatims Wztlwt InfriTJiing the TRIPS Agnmmt· TheProbkm and TheSoIutim, 2 W A9-l.U. J. L.
& PoL'y 371 (2000). Also, Jinghua Zou, Ria! and C1»:se, A71,)Ole' The Fifix fM1" Trips G«waJiJicd Indicatims
Ontinues, 27 B.G INT'L & CDMP. L. REv. 1141 (2004).
92 Article 22, TRIPS AGREEMENT,supra note 2. See Ronald Knaak, The.Prot8:ticn ifG«waJiJicd Indicatiws
Acwn:/ing to the TRIPS Agmmnt, in FROM GATTS TO TRIPS - nm AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED
AsPECTS OF INTELLECTUALPROPERTYRIGHTS (FRlEDRlrn.KARL BEIR AND GERHARDSCHRICKER,EDs.,
1996) at 117, 119.
9J Article 23, TRIPS AGREEMENT, supra note 2.
94 Article 24, TRIPS AGREEMENT, supra note 2. In Europe, the prime example of a system of
geographic indications is found in France, where local products (prrxiuits de tenvir) "occupy a special niche in
the present agricultural and foodstuffs sector of southern Europe," including France, Spain, Italy and
Portugal. Another example is the artisans of several Native American tribes from the southwestern region of
the United States who earn as much as $ 800 million annually from commercial sales of arts and crafts.
Downes, supra note 58 at 270.9, Article IS, TRIPS AGREEMENT,supra note 2.
% See Paul J. Heald, Tradimarks and Guwathicd Indicatials: Exploring the Ontr.rm of the TRIPS Agrammt, 29
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 635, 655 (1996). They also respond to certain indigenous concerns more effectively
than do other IPRs. In particular, rights to control trademarks and geographical indications can be maintained
in perpetuity, and they do not confer a monopoly right over the use of certain information, but simply limit
the class of people who can use a specific symbol.
its culture and customs. The goodwill and reputation built by producers over many
years, and in some cases over centuries, are thus rewarded.
It is imperative that western corporations, pharmaceutical companies, and
researchers secure prior informed consent from indigenous communities before
they can legally utilize their traditional knowledge or native biological resources.97
An explicit prior informed consent, acquired in a way that is culturally sensitive to
indigenous communities, must be secured prior to the collection of samples from
any subjects.98 Biopiracy, is often a covert activity shrouded in corporate mystery.
The exploitation of innocent and helpless members of the indigenous communities
from developing countries, often without even the most basic of formal education,
is a morally abhorrent act which must be made illegal.99
Giu:n the history of dx i:n1enurtiorutl
intel.la:t:ualproperty system, the noticn
that either the pre- or post-TRIPS
multildterttl system is basal. upon.
a:msensus is still a myth as far as
deuloping CDlfJ7bies are COI1I1!I?1fXi...
{G]iu:n the wlues reJlectaiin the curren1
inte1l«:tual property system, wlues uhU:h
are damaI. "uniT.:ersaI." yet are clearly
not, thereis no assuraru:ethat the current
fretme1.WYk will Wufi1 deuioping
CDlfJ7bies in any sigpifrant w:ry.
97 For discussion on the definition md nature of legally-binding prior informed consent: please see:
Me1mie Nakagawa, Oz.tnliw oj Prior InjOrrmi O:ment fan an Inumtttional Perspa;til:e, 4 SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT LAw AND POLICY (2004) 4; Anne Perrault, Facilitating Prior InjOrrmi On.mt in the Ontext of
G.'n(1i£:Resourcesand TraditiJ::nalKnauialr,r, 4 SUSTAINABLEDEV'T L. & PeL 'y 21 (2004); Jenifer Ross, Lc'l!fllly
Binding Prior InjOnnal Onsent, 10 COLO. J. INT'!..ENVT'L. L. & POL'y 499 (1999); Nuno Pires de C:uv3lho, hem
the Shaman's Hut to the Palmt Ojfia!: In Search of a TRIPS·Cmsislmt Rrxplinmmt to Disclose the Origin oj Q'I1I.1i£:
Resourcesand Prior InjOn-nfflO:ment, 17 WASH.U. J. L. & POLY 111 (2005).
98 See, Folkins, supra note 35 at 355. Joji Carino, IndignGtis Peoples' RiFf1t to hoc, PriCK,InjOnnal OJn.<{'I1L·
RefUrtimsCKI~andPraaUe, 22 ARIZ.J. INT'!..&COMP. L. 19 (2005).
99 Please see analogous discussion of prior-informed consent and indigenous communities, Alex Page,
IndignoilS Peoples' Free Prior and InfOnn«l.0Jnsmt in the Inter-Ameriam Human Riixs Sysum, 4 SUSTAINABLEDEV'l"
L. & POL'y 16 (2004); Fergus MacKay, IndignalS Peoples'Rip to Free, Prior and InjOnnal O:ment and the World
Bank's Extraail:e IwlStries Ret:iew, 4 SUSTAINABLEDEV'T L & POL'y 43 (2004); Anne Deruynere, PemiurJ.
01a/.Ieng3 to RCWiflitiJ::noj Prior and Inftmnal Cmsmt ojlndignalS Peoplesanel.Other La:aI Ommmi1ies: The EXpenfflcL~
of the Inter-American lJeuioprmt Bank, 4 SUSTAINABLEDEV'T L & POL'y 40 (2004).
100 Ruth L. Gana, The Myth oj IJeu:loprmt, The Progress if Rig,ts: Hlonan RiFf1ts to Intelltmldi. Property dI1d
Deu-ioJmmt, 18 LAw ANDPOLICY315,334 - 335 (1996).
In concluding, the question is posed, thus: Is biotechnology or biopiracy
within the framework of TRIPS inimical to the interests of developing nations? The
answer to the question posed may clearlybe in the affirmative, but the answer falls
short of being the solution.
It is clear that the polarized international debate is oversimplified. This is,
without a doubt, more than just a trade issue. From this perspective, the complex
and evolving policy context of globalization and inequality must be considered, in
order for the debate to be meaningful.lOI
The growing disparities between the North and the South puts to serious
question the very tenets of free trade liberalization and its relationship to
development.I02 The unilinear model of development purportedly followed by the
Western world failed to bring about its promise of economic growth to the Third
World nations.I03
In reality, the debate over the TRIPS Agreement for the poorest
developing countriesl04 IS one of practical insignificance.Jos The promises of
101 See for example, Keith Aoki, N~ Anti·07rmns Property,and BitJ.Pira:y in the (Not.So-Bral£)
New World 0rrJer if I71teJ'rlt1timdJProperty Protirtim, 6 GWBAL LEGAL STIJDIES J. 11 (1998·1999). The
proponents of capitalist economic theol)', from which 1RlPS is premised, posit that a completely liberalized
global market is will bring about development. However, in practice, eliminating barriers to trade and opening
markets do not necessarily generate development. The global marketplace is dominated by rich developed
countries and large multinational corporations which breed vel)' unequal relations of power and information.
Consequently, trade is inherently unequal and poor countries often experience not rising well·being but
increasing unemployment, poverty, and income inequality. Also see, Ruth L. Okedji, TI:eInternatiooal Relations
if IntdItuual Property:NarratilR5 if Deuioping Camtry Partripation in the G1nbll IntdItuual Property Systim, 7 SING. J.
INT'L & Q)MP. L. 315 (2003).
102 The numerous works of Professor Reichman, among other leading scholars, extensively discusses this
issue. Please see, J. H. Reichman, C1ttrti~ the 0JIlapse if the Patmt·Q;pyrigx Didxxany: PrFmisesfUr a Restn«:turfd
Intem4tia1tJl Property Systml, 13 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L. J. 475 (1995); J. H. Reichman, Cm7{iiancewiJh the
TRIPS Agmmm' Intrrx1u:tim toa SdoIarfyDtiute, 29 VAND.J. "TRANsNAT'LL 363 (1996);JR. Reichman, Frrm
Frre Traders to Fair FoI1au£rs:G1nbll Canp6:itim Under the Trips Agnmmt, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.& POL. 11 (1997);
J. H. Reichman, The TRIPS Qmpnmt if the GA ITs UTUgfIay Rcund: Omfxritite Prospa::tsfUr IntdIa1ual Property
~ in an Integratai World Market, 4 FORDHAM lNTEll. PRoP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 171 (1993); J.H.
Reichman, Unitmal Minimzm Standards if IntdIa1ual Property Pruar:tionunder the TRIPS C07'1fXJW1tof the IVlD
Agnmmt, 29lNT'L LAw. 345 (1995).
10) Gana, supra note 100. But see, Lee Petherbridge, Intellig:nt TRIPS Imp/tmtntatim: A StrategyfUr ClJuntries
en the Otsp if~, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L EmN. L 1029, 1032 (1995), who argues that it may be a more
effective strategy for developing countries to embrace international propeny standards. See also, Jean
Raymond Homere, IntdItuual Property Ritts Om Help Stimulate the Eccnanic fruJrprmt if Least lJerR1JJpr:rJ.
OxIJ1tries,27 Q)LUM. J. L. & ARTS 277 (2004). See also, John E. Guist, Non·OJrr¢anrewiJh TRIPS by lJerR1JJpr:rJ.
andDeuiopingOJuntries: Is TRIPS Working?, 8 IND. INT'L&CoMP. L. REv. 69 (1997 - 1998).
104 The United States is a pan of the developed or industria1ized world, which consists of about 50
countries with a combined population of only 0.9 billion, less than one sixth of the world's population. In
COlJtrast, approximately 5' billion people live in the developing world. This world is made up of about 125 low
and middle· income countries in which people generally have a lower standard of living with access to fewer
goods and services than people in high.income countries. Bread forthe World Institute, Are We en Track To
End Hlmw? HUNGER REPORT 2004. Online at: <http://www.bread.org/institute/hunger Jeport
/index.html>. ;
10, Seeratan Nadia Natasha, The Negttit£ Impxt if IntdIa1ual PropertyPatmt Ri[fJts on Deuioping 0Juntries: An
Examinatit:n if the Indian Phrmrta:mtiml Industry, 3 THE SOlOLAR: ST. MARy's LAW REVIEW ON MINORITY
ISSUES339 (2001). Also, Keith E. Maskus, IntdIa1ual PropertyRiiPts and Eccnanic Deuioprmt, 32 CASEW. REs.
economic growth, development and an improved standard of living seem all but
illusory to them - because on a daily basis, the only issue that pre-occupies them is
one of mere surviwl.106
It is, however, not an entirely bleak picture. Not much can be gained if the
developing world, nurturing perpetual feelings of distrust, animosity and suspicion,
will isolate itself from the rest of the world.l°7 The current international legal,
economic and political infrastructure, which includes the WTO and TRIPS, can
provide an avenue for developing countries to articulate their needs. In fact, even
within the framework of the TRIPS Agreement, there is much to be expected on
what is on paper. The developing nations can explore these possibilities.108
It may be too much optimism or naivety perhaps, but hope, especially for
one coming from a developing country where it can be the only thing one has, is
worth a lot.109
J. lNT'L L. 471 (2000), who provides an analytical overview of how economic development may be promoted
or hindered by an effective system of intellectual property rights.
106 According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 852 million people
across the world are hungry in 2004, up from 842 million a year ago. FOOD AND AGRlCUL1URE
ORGANlZATJON OF THE UNITED NATJONS, STATEOF FOOD INSECURITYIN THE WORLD 2004. Online at:
<Imp:! /www.fao.org/documents/show_cdr.asp?url_file=/docrep/007/y5650e/y5650eOO.htm> .
107 Please see, Roy Culpeper, Apprrxtdx:s to GloluIi.7L1tim and Inequalitywilhin. the Intemational System. Online
at: The North South Institute < http://www.nsi-ins.ca/english/pdfIUNRISD -'paper.pdf> at 7.
IOS For example, developed countries members of wro are obliged, under Article 67 of the TRIPs
Agreement, to provide "technical and financial co-operation" in favour of develQping and least developed
countries to facilitate the implementation of the TRIPs Agreement. Such co-operation, which is to be
provided upon request and on mutually agreed terms and conditions, includes assistance in the preparation of
laws and regulations, support for domestic offices and in the prevention of abuse of IPRs. This obligation on
the part of developed countries, if not adequately ful.filled, may be the subject matter of a claim before the
Council for TRIPs, as in the case of any other obligation defined by the Agreement. See also the positive spirit
in wro. DoHA wro M1NJSTERIAL2001, DEClARATION ON THE 1RIPS AGREEMENT AND PUBllC
HEALlH, (WTIMIN(01)/DEC/2 of November 20, 2001). See also, Hansel T. Pham, Deu10ping Coimtries and
the W7D..1he Ne«1f;r Mare MediatUnin tI:x>DSU, 9 HARv. NEGOTJATIONL. REv. 331 (2004).
109 The author is from the Philippines, categorized a third-world nation, he surmises, probably ever since
the label has been invented. It has been at the cusp of development for three centuries, after a succession of
colonial rule.
